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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20050 169-CA
TERRY JOHNSON,

Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

POINTS OF REBUTTAL
I. THE STATE HAS ERRED ON THE RULE 404(b) EVIDENCE ISSUES.

A. The State has Waived the Kicking Fetus Issue.
Mr. Johnson argued in his opening brief that the trial court erred, and defense
counsel was ineffective, by allowing the jury to hear, and by failing to object to,
undisclosed and highly prejudicial 404(b) evidence, which unfairly surprised Mr. Johnson
in the middle of trial. The evidence was that Mr. Johnson had tried to kill his unborn child
by kicking his wife in the stomach while she was pregnant. Br. Aplt. at 15-16. Failure by
the State to address this issue in its opposing brief should be viewed as a waiver and
admission by the State, that the trial court committed reversible, harmful error, and that

trial counsel was ineffective as to this point. In re: Mortgage Escrow Deposit Litigation,
1995 WL 59238 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
B. The State has Misapplied the Law Pertaining to
The Trial Court's Ruling on the Belt-Choking Evidence.

1. The Initial Focus Should be on Defense Counsel's Failure
To Object to the Use of this Evidence at Trial.
The State takes the position, that the trial court's post-trial ruling on the issue of
whether the evidence indicating that Mr. Johnson had choked his wife with a belt was
properly before the jury, was correct, because the evidence: (1) was a foundation for Mr.
Johnson's out of court statements (without the trial court ever specifying what it was
referring to); and, (2) showed Mr. Johnson's wife's reluctance for disclosing prejudicial
information to the police. Brief, Apee. p. 19-20 (referring to Addendum B, Opening Brief
by Appellant).
The State also argues that State v. Bates, 784 P.2d 1126 (Utah 1989) proves that
there was no reversible error as to this issue. However, initially, and for the following
reasons, Bates is highly distinguishable. In Bates, defense counsel: (1) objected to the
Rule 404(b) evidence during trial; (2) the reason for the evidence's usage was clearly
stated and ruled upon by the trial court, i.e., to prove state of mind; and, (3) notice ofuse at
trial was not an issue. Thus, Bates, among other things, had to due with the trial court's
discretion to allow properly objected to 404(b) evidence during trial.
The State argues further that defense counsel was not ineffective, because they
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raised a belt-choking objection in their motion for a new trial. Brief. Apee, p. 34.
However, in this instance, because defense counsel had failed to object to the belt-choking
evidence at trial, the focus initially should be whether Mr. Johnson was denied a fair trial
under the Sixth Amendment, rather than whether the court abused its discretion post-trial.
The Sixth Amendment violation requires de novo review. State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232,
1239 (Utah App. 1995). The latter standard is abuse of discretion. State v. Weaver, 6 P.3d
167 (1931). As discussed infra, defense counsel's failure to object to the belt-choking
evidence at trial was objectively deficient, and casts serious doubt on the ability of the jury
to assess the evidence fairly. Furthermore, to imply that these standards of review are
interchangeable is a gross misstatement of law.
2. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Denying a
New Trial Based Upon the Belt-Choking Evidence.
In the alternative, should this court determine that the abuse of discretion standard
is appropriate, the trial court's decision is reversible error, nevertheless, under the abuse of
discretion standard. Under this standard, this court will review a trial court's ruling for
correctness as a matter oflaw. State ex. rei. WA., 63 P.3d 607, 611 (Utah 2002).
In its opposing brief, the State correctly represents the reasons for the trial court
denying the motion for a new trial on the belt-choking evidence issue. Those reasons were
that the unspecified "incidences of domestic violence were elicited as foundation for
Defendant's statements. These incidences also explained Defendant's ex-wife's
reluctance to initially reveal information against the Defendant." (Br. Apee. at 19 &
3

Addendum B). The State contends that the trial court's decision was correct, simply
because domestic violence evidence may be used as a foundation to explain a witness's
testimony in a case involving domestic violence in general.
However, for the following reasons, Mr. Johnson respectfully contends that the
State's position is erroneous. First, the Utah legislature requires pre-trial disclosure of this
kind of evidence. Cf Gomez v. State, 9 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tx. 1999) (where a Texas
Appellate Court called notice for a 404(b) evidence a substantial due process right).
Consequently, use of such evidence without notice is presumptively a violation of due
process, and a violation of legislative mandate.
Secondly, the trial court's ruling also seems inordinately unreasonable, because a
court must conduct a balancing of interests under Rule 403 before it considers allowing
404(b) evidence for any purpose. See State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366, 370 (Utah App.
1996). It is clear that the trial court never conducted such balancing, because it never
stated why the belt-choking evidence was more probative than prejudicial in its
conclusions of law for its denial of the new trial motion. R.579-580, Aplt. Opening Brief,
Ex. B. Consequently, the trial court's ruling cannot be within the realm of reasonableness
per se. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P .2d 232, 239-240 (Utah 1992).
Thirdly, 404(b) evidence can only be used for specific purposes, i.e., to show
absence of mistake, identity, motive, intent or a common scheme or plan. State v.

Hamilton, 827 P .2d 232, 239 (Utah 1992). It can never be used as a foundation to support
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other 404(b) evidence because of its inherently prejudicial nature. See !d. Therefore, the
State's contention that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Johnson's
motion for a new trial is also a misstatement of law.
3. The Trial Court's Error in Allowing the
Belt-choking Evidence was not Harmless.
Nevertheless, although it is evident that the trial court abused its discretion in not
granting a new trial, this court must still determine whether this error was harmless. I d.
The harmless error standard requires that the error be significant enough, that there is a
reasonable likelihood that a different outcome would have been rendered by the jury, if the
evidence had been excluded. ld.
The State cites State v. Grant, 920 P.2d 609 (Wash. App. 1996) for the position that
domestic violence evidence can be used to explain a victim's inconsistent statements.
Again, Grant is highly distinguishable. When a victim is the only material witness in a
domestic violence case, the victim's credibility is the central issue in a "He said" "She
said" case. Id. at 614. Therefore, prior acts of domestic violence are material evidence to
help the trier of fact understand a witness's inconsistent statements, or to show a victim's
state of mind.
However, as stated supra, a court must always balance whether 404(b) evidence is
more probative than prejudicial before allowing a jury to use it carte blanche. For
example, in LaMarr v. Lang, 796 So.2d 1208 (Fla. App. 2001), the Court of Appeals for
Florida held that use of evidence to show that a party had a propensity for violence was not
5

harmless error, because the evidence was highly prejudicial, and the central issue was the
credibility of a party.
However, in this instance, whether Mrs. Johnson reluctantly revealed the beltchoking incident or not was not material to the outcome of this case. The State presented
other testimony by Mrs. Johnson, that Mr. Johnson was a drug user (raising the issue of
motive), that a knife in their kitchen was missing (raising the issue of access to a deadly
weapon) and that Mrs. Johnson gave the baby blanket with the victim's DNA to the police
(raising the issue of opportunity). Thus, the collateral issue as to why Mrs. Johnson had
not disclosed the belt-choking incident earlier to the police was not central to the State's
case. That is, the relevance of this information was not an element of a defense or a crime,
and Mrs. Johnson was not a party or a victim. Consequently, whether the introduction of
the belt-choking evidence was unduly prejudicial was a dispositive issue for the trial
court's consideration, in light of the authorities cited supra and infra, and should not be
considered harmless.
For example, in another case which addressed this issue, i.e., United States v.

Sanders, 964 F.2d 295, 297-99 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth Circuit essentially ruled the
same way as the court did in LaMarr. That is, in Sanders, the Fourth Circuit held that it
was not harmless error, when a trial court allowed violent propensity evidence of the
defendant to be considered in an assault prosecution. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that in
an assault prosecution, use of prior assaultive conduct by the defendant as 404(b) evidence
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could only have been construed by a jury to show propensity for violence (implicitly
because the nature of the conduct in both instances was similar in usage despite rule 403
balancing). !d. The fourth circuit also held, that because the assessment of the
protagonists' credibility was essential in reaching a fair decision, the error was not
harmless. !d. at 300.
Thus, in this instance, where the testimony adduced from the State's own witness,
i.e., the decedent's mother, was that Mr. Johnson and the victim actually liked each other
(R.615, p. 113, I. 6-25), that her son carried knives (R.615, p. 122), that her son played
with an older boy who taught him how to knife fight (R.617, p. 461 ), that the decedent
carried knives because he was afraid of gangs (R.617, p. 464 ), that the police had
immediately interviewed Mr. Johnson after the murder (and found no incriminating
evidence on his body) (R.615, p. 152-153), that this case was brought 10 years after the
incident had occurred (record in its entirety) and that no DNA evidence belonging to Mr.
Johnson was found at the scene of the crime (record in its entirety), it is highly likely that
this past propensity for violence evidence swayed the jury to believe that Mr. Johnson was
the kind of person who lost his temper easily, and could have killed the boy (especially if
intoxicated). For this reason, and in light of the authorities cited, it is only reasonable to
conclude, that the trial court's decision regarding the propensity for violence evidence was
not harmless error.
Mr. Johnson acknowledges in the abstract, that perhaps the State's best sur-rebuttal
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argument to this position, is that Mrs. Johnson's credibility was a material issue at trial,
since she had made the disclosure about the belt-choking incident later on in the
investigation. However, this is not a cogent position on balance because: (1) in light of the
inherently prejudicial nature of this kind of evidence, there was a grave danger that the
jury would make erroneous assumptions about Mr. Johnson's character; and, (2) as stated
previously, the State presented a great deal of other evidence, even without eliciting the
belt-choking testimony from Mrs. Johnson, e.g., the butcher knife was missing from the
kitchen, and Mr. Johnson used drugs and stole things. Thus, based upon the argument and
authorities cited, it is apparent that the trial court's error was not harmless.
4. The Trial Court's Jury Instruction as to 404(b)
Evidence Also was not Harmless Error.
The State also contends that since the trial court gave a cautionary instruction as to
the 404(b) evidence, it did not abuse its discretion. Brief. Apee. p. 17. However, a court's
jury instruction for 404(b) evidence must identify the evidence to which it refers, and
carefully direct the jury how it should apply such evidence. United States v.
Merriweather, 78 F.3d 1070, 1077-78 (6th Cir. 1996). For example, in United States v.
Marino, 65 8 F .2d 1120, 1124 (6th Cir. 1981 ), the Sixth Circuit held, that where the trial

court had carefully identified the 404(b) evidence for the jury, and had guided them as to
which of the five, potential applications actually did apply, e.g., intent, the jury instruction
was reasonably and fairly crafted.
However, as in Merriweather, the trial court in this instance did not identify what
8

the 404(b) evidence was, and stated that the jury could use the evidence carte blanche for
any of the five 404(b) purposes (R. 338, Addendum A). This action by the trial court
violated fundamental fairness, since several of the theoretical uses for the evidence did not
apply, e.g., to show absence of mistake. United States v. Merriweather, 78 FJd at 107778. Thus, as a matter of law, the trial court improperly encouraged negative inferences to
be drawn about Mr. Johnson's character. Thus, this error was not harmless under the
holdings in Merriweather and Marino.
II. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT REGARDING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S
FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTION'S CLAIM THAT
MR. JOHNSON WAS A LIAR IS A MISAPPLICATION OF LAW.
The State also contends that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to
object to the prosecutor frequently calling Mr. Johnson a liar during closing argument.
Brief Apee. P. 42-46. As a basis for its position, the State cites to various cases, where a
defendant actually testified at trial, and his in-court statements differed from that of the
other evidence presented. Brief Apee. p. 44. But in this instance, Mr. Johnson never did
testify. Consequently, since Mr. Johnson never had an opportunity to explain any
allegedly inconsistent statements made to the police at trial, it is reasonable to conclude
that the prosecutor's statements were improper, and that his lawyers were ineffective for
not correcting these inflammatory misstatements under the authorities cited in Mr.
Johnson's opening brief.
The State, also having waived an evidentiary hearing on the ineffectiveness issue,
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now speculates in its brief that "it is possible to surmise a legitimate trial tactic" for
defense counsels' omissions. Brief Apee. p. 45-46. But this is impossible, since this court
does not know what defense counsels' trial tactics were. Indeed, this court has denied Mr.
Johnson's Rule 23(b) motion. Hence, the record is as complete as it is going to get, and
for the State to speculate as to what defense counsel's trial tactics actually were is
Improper. See State v. Litherland, 12 P.3d 92, 98-99 (Utah 2000).
CONCLUSION

Under the objective standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), there was ineffective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel failed to object
during trial to highly prejudicial 404(b) evidence. There is a reasonable probability that
the evidence, in light of the authorities cited, could have been viewed by the jury as
propensity for violence evidence, and that Mr. Johnson had murdered the boy as a result of
this character trait. But for the introduction of this evidence, there is a reasonable
probability that a jury would have rendered a different verdict, in light of the probative
evidence against such an inference presented at trial.
Additionally, under the harmless error standard, the trial court's abuse of discretion
on the 404(b) issue was not harmless error per se. The trial court never conducted rule 403
balancing to assess the probative value of the belt-choking evidence vs. whether the
evidence was unduly prejudicial. It also gave a jury instruction that violated fundamental
fairness, most likely, mislead the jury. Under the authorities cited, this was not harmless
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error per seas well. Also, under the authorities cited, the trial court's decisions were not
within the bounds of reasonableness.
Lastly, to preserve the public's confidence in the judicial process, it is necessary to
vacate this conviction, which was rendered through several, serious misapplications of
law.
For these reasons, and for any others which this court believes apply, Mr. Johnson
respectfully contends that he be afforded a new trial, to uphold the principles articulated in
the fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Resp ctfully
1
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APPENDIX A
JURY INSTRUCTION BY TRIAL COURT
FOR USE OF RULE 404(B) EVIDENCE
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Instruction No.

;?o

The State has introduced evidence of other alleged wrongs or acts attributed to
the defendant that he is not charged with in the Information in this case. You may use
this evidence to show the defendant's identity, motive, plan, preparation, knowledge,
intent, opportunity, or absence of accident as to the crimes that have been charged in the
Information. You may consider this evidence relating to other acts from the witnesses
today solely for the purposes that I've just explained and may not draw from such
evidence the inference that the defendant has a character trait that establishes he
probably acted in conformity with that trait.

